가. 일시 : 3월 22일(금) 12시 ~ 13시

나. 장소 : 미래관 906호 세미나실

다. 연사 : 박준록 교수님 (대만국립대)

라. 제목 : Buyer-optimal Learning in Collective Purchase Problems

마. 초록 : We consider the buyer-optimal learning problem in collective purchase problems, where a group of buyers plans to purchase a good from a monopolist seller, which benefits everyone in the group in a non-rivalrous and non-exclusive fashion. A benevolent expert determines the buyers’ information structure before they join the monopolist’s mechanism. Since the good resembles public goods, a received intuition predicts underprovision due to the seller’s market power and the buyers’ free-riding. This paper solves the buyer-optimal Learning problem, an information design problem preceding the monopolist’s optimal sales mechanism. The solution cross-subsidizes the informational rents among buyers so that the seller finds it optimal to sell the efficient quantity. An explicit solution for the two-buyer case illustrates it in detail. From a robust prediction perspective, the set of potential surplus divisions is characterized in the large economy. Contrary to the classical negative results, the monopolist’s profit can be bounded, while the good is always provided to the buyers.