가. 일시 : 4월 4일(목) 12시 ~ 13시

나. 장소 : 미래관 906호 세미나실

다. 연사 : 문지웅 교수님 (조세재정연구원)

라. 제목 : Duration Dependence, Adverse Selection, and Information Acquisition

마. 초록 :   This paper studies a dynamic adverse selection model where firms post wages and acquire information about workers’ productivity with costs. The equilibrium fully separates types without firms’ screening regardless of information cost if the productivity differential is small. When the differential is large, there is a threshold information cost below which the equilibrium consists of a high-wage/screening job and a low-wage/non-screening job. The average reemployment wage increases over the unemployment duration in a fully separating equilibrium, while it may either increase or decrease in an upward pooling equilibrium. I characterize the precise conditions governing the equilibrium type and the direction of duration dependence.