[2023학년도 1학기]

경제학부 특강(세미나) 5차

– 일시 : 5월 11일(목) 12시~13시

– 장소 : 미래관 906호

– 주제 : Labor Market Screening and the Design of Social Insurance:  An Equilibrium Analysis of the Labor Market for the Disabled

– 연사 : 중앙대학교 이수련 교수님

– 논문 요약 :

This paper studies how firms’ screening incentives in the labor market affect the optimal design of social insurance programs and quantitatively assesses the U.S. disability policies  accounting for firms’ screening of the disabled. We develop an equilibrium search model where  workers with different productivities have heterogeneous preferences over non-wage benefits  and firms cannot offer an employment contract that explicitly depends on worker types. In  this environment, firms may use contracts to screen out a certain type of workers, distorting  employment rates and contracts in equilibrium. Therefore, the optimal structure of social  insurance policies depends on firms’ screening incentives. We extend and structurally estimate  this framework to quantitatively understand the inefficiencies arising from firms’ incentives  to screen out disabled workers and examine the optimal joint design of disability insurance  (DI) and various forms of firm subsidies. We find that hiring subsidies mitigate screening  d istortions; at the same time, they interact with DI by reducing the labor supply disincentives it  generates. The optimal policy structure leads to a considerable welfare gain by simultaneously  making firm subsidies and DI benefits more generous.